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Abstract 
 This paper examines the turn to considerations of property in arguments regarding the 
commons and the human right to water. It identifies commitments to liberalism in political 
economy approaches to property and human rights and develops a matrix for identifying non-
liberal conceptions of the commons. The latter hold potential for an agonistic politics in which 
human rights are compatible with ecological sensibilities regarding the dynamics of conflict and 
cooperation in complex systems. 
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Property and the right to water: toward a non-liberal commons 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Debate over the human right to water is expanding to include issues of property rights, 
and this in two ways. In one instance, focusing on property rights is seen as a holding more 
potential than human rights for “politically progressive strategies” in the sense that, 
“[e]ffectively realizing human rights…requires the articulation of property rights, water rights 
and the human right to water” (Bakker 2012: 37). In another more controversial and potentially 
more litigious view, granting all individuals a transferable property right to water is touted as the 
best way to accomplish the material and political goals of the human right to water while 
addressing water security (World Economic Forum 2011). Typically, the material goals of the 
human right to water center on securing adequate water for the life and livelihoods of all, but 
particularly of individuals either presently without, or on a trajectory to be deprived of, water 
(Gleick 1998). However, in view of large-scale uncertainties surrounding human impacts on the 
global water cycle it is not clear how individual human rights should be scaled (if at all) to 
complex systems (Vörösmarty et al. 2004; Milly et al. 2008). This is because granting rights to 
fixed amounts of water carries the risk that the total water claimed under human rights may 
exceed what is ecologically viable (Eckstein 2010). The political goals of the human right to 
water are also nuanced, ranging from attempts to arrest oppression, contest neo-liberal 
privatization trends, address socio-cultural inequities, or to achieve environmental security, 
protect community values and implement ‘watershed democracy’ (see Sultana and Loftus 2012; 
Conca 2006). Many of these broader political goals make appeals to notions of the ‘water 
   3 
 
commons’ and, in this context, this paper considers how increasing attention to property rights 
affects understandings and appropriations of the commons.  
 
Advocates of the human right to water frequently argue for collective forms of 
governance under various guises of ‘the commons’ in order to counter the individualist tenets of 
property rights or variants of liberalism more broadly. Yet as Bakker (2012) argues—citing a UN 
report on human rights and access to water and sanitation to this effect (OHCHR 2010)—
articulating the human right to water in terms of the commons does not, of itself, eliminate the 
potential for privatization of water services. Johnston (2003) has questioned the strategy of 
linking human development, common resources and environmental sustainability to broader 
structural processes and forces—political, economic and cultural—because in many cases 
economic success is premised on ‘acceptable’ tradeoffs with ecological destruction; tradeoffs 
that are typically ambiguous and often shuttered from contestation. Nevertheless, advocates for 
the human right to water gain considerable political and moral purchase from appeals to the 
commons. In this paper, we attempt to sort out why this is so in order to assess how the diverse 
political aims contextualizing the human right to water variously confront perceived threats 
while framing governance opportunities in relation to complex and shared water systems. 
 
The paper begins by introducing the field of human rights from the perspective of political 
economy, drawing attention to the on-going attempts to explain the relationships of individuals 
to society in political liberalism. The paper then shows how issues of political economy bear on 
the human right to water in relation to claims about the commons. Next we develop and describe 
a matrix for understanding multiple (and often competing) accounts of the commons. The 
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argument developed is that, when considered as a problem of relating parts to the whole, both the 
political economy of property rights and claims about the commons can be assessed for how they 
foreground the human right to water in political and normative terms. 
 
The final section of the paper argues that, once construed as a part-whole problem, the 
distinctions enabled by the proposed matrix can be used to parse out an agonistic conception of 
the commons. This agonistic approach is based on the idea that competition for water is among 
adversaries, not enemies, and that what is required is a governance format that compatible with 
both competitive and cooperative action. Further, this general approach enables an assessment of 
accounts of the commons for their fit with ecological understandings of cooperation and 
competition between parts and wholes. Thus, rather than accede to the idea that a human right to 
water is perhaps best seen as a “strategy” for countering neo-liberal narratives (i.e. Bakker 2010; 
Bond 2010) we commit to the idea that different forms of collective tenure evident in the 
commons reflect the ordering power of legal and social norms as an expression of communal 
agency. This enables a more robust account of the material, political and moral reasons to evoke 
the sustaining role of water in support of non-liberal forms of life, and versions of the commons 
built upon them. As such, it unsettles, and opens a space for replacing, the antagonism presumed 
between independent persons and collective institutions presumed at the basis of many accounts 
of both property rights and the commons. Further, it opens out onto non-liberal conceptions of 
the commons.  
 
2. Human Rights  
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Human rights are “the product of a particular moment and place” (Kennedy 2002), and 
they represent one expression of what it means to be human. In this regard, it bears noting that 
the original draft of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was a transliteration of 
Henri Bergson’s vitalist philosophy (Curle 2007). As such, it carries the vitalist impulse 
regarding the creative potential of humanity in overcoming environmental limits. Furthermore, 
these original vitalist claims about ‘humanity’ were not grounded in claims about the 
transcendental rationality of the (Kantian) subject but in progressive and creative evolution, a 
claim other philosophers derided as a “hasty generalization” from evolutionary biology to human 
destiny (Russell 1929: 21). Nevertheless, human rights retain an ethos of aspiration, a fact not to 
be confused or conflated with how they are legal aspirations as well – this in the sense that, while 
claiming legal status, they lack the administering force of the state law (Desmond 1983).
1
 As 
Zaraloudis (2006) makes clear, the essentialist claims uniting legal and philosophic notions of 
‘humanity’ do not allow ‘human rights’ and material access rights to be equated. 
 
                                                 
1
 Only international covenants, conventions, protocols and statutes are said to be legally binding 
and then only for those states that ratify them. So although declarations of human rights may 
command political and moral attention, they often lack legal significance, not to mention the 
enforcement mechanisms required to exact commensurate justice with their violations. For 
instance, the development of a global economy has seen the persistent violation of human rights 
from various sources, including states (including representative bodies such as military, police or 
even the courts) and corporations.  
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The UDHR was passed in 1948, a time since which there has been a persistent effort to 
avoid essentialist claims about individuals while maintaining claims to universality with respect 
to ‘humanity’. This has led to several debates, of which we only highlight the poles. Shue (1996), 
for instance, argues that we can secure three basic rights for persons—subsistence, security and 
liberty—for understanding and contextualizing reciprocal moral, political and economic 
obligations. While others, such as Teeple (2005), argue that there are no elemental, inherent, or 
universal aspects to human rights except that they are contextualized by particular modes of 
production and, as such, are reflective of broader programs in political economy and prevailing 
relations of property rights.  
 
Given the tension between the fact that any operational human right adheres to a 
particular person and ambivalence towards essentialist forms of universal definitions of said 
person(s), human rights can be seen as relative to a given social system and its corresponding 
political expressions (i.e. the other types of rights already recognized in a given social system 
and around which social and ecological relationships are ordered). For instance, since other 
rights are predicated upon it, the most basic human right is that to an adequate standard of living 
(UDHR, Article 25)—food, clothing, housing and medical care (amongst others). Yet explaining 
the fit of ‘basic rights’ implicates theories of how various rights fit together. And in the instance 
of the UDHR, the basic organizing premises for interpreting human rights are rarely (if ever) 
referenced to its vitalist roots. Rather, interpretations take their leave from liberalism that, as 
Watson (1999) argues, is tied to a conceptualization of individuality and rights of non-
interference.  
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The liberal conception of individuals conceives of persons according the ideals of 
individual autonomy, rational self-governance and as oriented towards achieving happiness. This 
conception of persons reifies abstract ideals as the basis for defining and protecting rights 
(Mouffe 2005; Tully 1995, 2008). That is, rights are designed to prohibit collective or 
interpersonal infringement on individuals based on ideals of autonomy, the rational requirements 
to sustain that autonomy and the freedom to pursue life projects that respect the same. In this 
way, communal or collective rights can be seen as threat to, or at very least an infringement 
upon, an individual’s basic rights. This, in strong versions, means that the holder of rights is an 
individual atomized from the whole. Notwithstanding more nuanced defenses of this tradition 
(considered below), this atomization cannot be divorced from the historical roots of liberalism 
that ordered society vis-à-vis existing power structures of property rights holders—such as in the 
right to not have slavery abolished because that would infringe on personal property (Losurdo 
2011). This history is often masked by arguments that make offerings regarding the rational basis 
of political liberalism that attempt to free it from considerations of political economy. Yet as 
Polanyi (2001) has argued, political liberalism and economic liberalism share a push-pull 
dynamic, where the former may attempt to check the proclivity of the latter towards dis-
embedding the economy from society.   
 
The tensions between political and economic freedom, and their corollary challenges with 
respect to the uneven context in which liberalism emerges, has led to competing explanations of 
where and how understandings of individual freedom fit with democratic institutions. As Taylor 
(2003) argues, this debate can be seen as working along two axes. The first is ontological, and 
has to do with whether ultimate explanations are atomistic or holistic; of whether social goods 
   8 
 
result from the aggregations of the parts and properties of individuals (atomism) or whether 
social goods are concatenations of individual goods (holism). The second relates to advocacy, 
and of what political primacy is given to individual rights versus communities or “the good of 
collective identities” (Taylor 2003: 195). The broader liberal-communitarian debate is not the 
topic of this paper, but Taylor’s distinctions are germane to theorizations of the commons that we 
take up below because these also show commitments of atomism or holism that do not 
necessarily determine commitments to individualism or collectivism. 
 
Returning to rights and their fit with political liberalism, it is important to not lose sight 
of the founding violence that established “the rule of law” and within which human rights are 
made operational (cf. Derrida 2002). This violence was not oriented haphazardly. Rather, it was 
and remains coincidental with the capitalist mode(s) of production that characterizes 
contemporary western economic and governance systems. And is evident in the enforcement of 
particular kinds of property rights that support those systems, the legitimized violence that 
accompanies these support systems, and that which justifies their effects on social-ecological 
landscapes (see Blomley 2003; Delaney 2010). As Pieterse (2007: 797) argues,  
 
“the transformative potential of rights is significantly thwarted by the fact that they are 
typically formulated, interpreted, and enforced by institutions that are embedded in the 
political, social, and economic status quo…phenomena such as ‘rights’ and ‘the state’ 
legitimize a collective experience of alienation (or suppression of a desire for 
connectedness) while simultaneously denying the fact of the experience.” 
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In this context, Teeple (2005: 21) highlights a corresponding worry for human rights when he 
argues that, 
 
“The human in the context of human rights, then, is nothing but the way the human 
appears in a society based on contractual relations; it is the human defined as isolated 
individual, as whole unto itself, as singularity, as an unrelated atom; it is not the human 
as a social being, as a product of social relations, whose chief characteristic is relations to 
others”. 
 
This emphasis on self-governed individuals, whose relations are mediated by property 
rights congruent with prevailing modes of production, distribution and consumption has 
intensified under the era of neo-liberal economic globalization. Neoliberalism diverges from 
classical liberalism’s attribution of rational economic behavior to human nature by imploring 
legal and economic interventions as part of a broader political rationality so that individual 
actions are constructed, maintained and reproduced not only by the rule of law and political 
institutions, but also the social relations that are a product of, and ultimately conform to capitalist 
modes of production (see Brown 2003). Indeed, as these forms of political rationality become 
more pervasive, they normalize diverse forms of social relations while winnowing away at 
competing, democratic forms of social reproduction. As Gill (1995: 399) writes, 
 
“The present world order involves a more ‘liberalized’ and commodified set of historical 
structures, driven by the restructuring of capital and a political shift to the right. This 
process involves the spatial expansion and social deepening of economic liberal 
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definitions of social purpose and possessively individualist patterns of action and 
politics.” 
 
It is the case that many types of rights are abstract in the sense that, beyond sentiments of 
ideals and aspirations, unless one has the means to exercise a right in question, that right may 
accomplish very little. Nevertheless, rights have the ability to affect peoples’ life prospects by 
virtue of how their means may be legitimately directed. In other words, in a world of legal 
abstractions, it is not a right that satisfies a need but rather a mutually dependent combination of 
the means to achieve said right which in turn make claims and entitlements practical and 
realizable (Teeple 2005). Yet as macroeconomic reform seeks to enclose ever more resources in 
the process of capital accumulation and wealth generating opportunity (Wallerstein 2011), the 
drive for material abundance pits individual rights holders against one another in a perpetual 
competitive struggle over scarce resources. As such, the relationship amongst individual rights 
holders is conceived of as antagonistic and, when amended under neo-liberalism, the 
manipulation of social relations is itself a legitimate means of wealth protection and generation. 
 
The uneven socio-political basis of rights holders is also part of what gives “human 
rights” a hopeful dimension within political liberalism insofar as it holds an aspiration toward 
conceiving of rights in terms that arrest and address uneven material conditions without 
compromising the ideals of individual liberty. This is the case in accounts that seek political 
legitimacy without reference to existing power structures, such as in Rawls’ (2001, 2005) 
“original position” and his claims regarding justice as fairness, and Habermas’ (1996) arguments 
regarding the co-original nature of normative and political legitimacy. These theorists highlight 
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how, rather than extending uneven social and material realities, liberal ideals may support 
accounts of rights and the task of achieving just political institutions in the context of balancing 
individual equality and social limits.  
 
Despite the theoretical promise of political liberalism to curtail uneven power 
relationships that rationalize the lifeworld through economic structures operating ‘behind the 
backs’ of citizens (cf. Habermas, 1996), there are reasons to question whether this is not 
accomplished at the expense of alternate forms of life. This has been the target of Mouffe’s 
(2005) criticisms regarding the failure of liberalism to account for the pluralistic nature of the 
social world itself and the genuine antagonisms that persist regarding which social world 
individual liberty operates in reference to. Tully (1995, 2008) has also drawn attention to the 
‘strange multiplicity’ of modern constitutional states and the need to give an account of social 
pluralism that does not require conformance to liberal versions of the world as a condition for 
political participation. Such criticisms reveal several problems in interpreting human rights 
through abstract ideals of liberalism and which also, as is argued below, come to bear on 
interpretations of the commons. First, there may be a propensity to further engrain conceptions of 
individual autonomy that do not fit with the lived experience of those over whom such ideals are 
extended. Second, human rights may suppress alternative ways of solving similar social 
problems such that the “equal possession of rights” is actually incongruous with fair “means to 
realize them” (Teeple 2005: 22). Third, and critically for the issue at hand, the relationships 
between individuals and the sum-total of their claims may be characterized prior to, or in the 
absence of, the empirical constraints imposed by limited and shared resources: such as water. 
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In sum, the predominance of individual rights to private property in economic modes of 
production forms the dominant conception of social relationships for human rights. Further, just 
as the liberal ideals of property connote relations between people with respect to things (not 
between owners and the object of property), so too do liberal definitions of human rights suggest 
that individual rights can be discharged through the balance of individual claims against 
collective infringements based on a commitment to abstract ideals about the human person; That 
is, relations are between individuals and an ideal, not between concrete others. But this is highly 
unsatisfactory to those who do not wish to support liberal forms of life and who may augur for an 
alternate rights framework for expressing and mediating relations between members of a 
community and their environment. The latter forms of rights are by definition relational, not 
abstract. Yet, as is considered next, what takes precedence in the liberal definition of the human 
right to water is the amount of water needed to satisfy exclusive individual interests. In this way, 
as Linton (2012: 48) points out, “the human right to water, as usually stated, fixes a relation 
between the individual human body and a quantity of water.”  
 
2.1 The human right to water 
 
In July 2010, the United Nations General Assembly voted to approve a draft resolution 
on the human right to water and sanitation. This was set against the very real backdrop of over 1 
billion persons who lack access to safe water and 2.6 billion who lack access to basic sanitation 
(UNDP 2006). Although previously implied under the 2002 UN General Comment No. 15—the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights created a mechanism for 
interpreting water as necessary to pursue other rights—the formal right was long debated. Since 
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the late 1990s, water experts had been developing metrics for defining a human right to water so 
as to avoid conditions of absolute water scarcity, with estimates of adequate clean water at 
between 30-50 litres of water per person per day (Gleick 1998). A second impetus was to address 
the trend towards the privatization of water services in less developed countries, where 
governance programs carried the potential to curtail access to water short of the universal 
aspirations of the UDHR (see Dellapenna and Gupta 2008). 
 
 As the debate over the human right to water evolved, it was unhelpfully cast as a matter 
of public versus private rights to water. Those wary of making water an individual human right 
pointed out the empirical problem that would exist if the aggregate of individual rights outpaced 
actual water availability either by population growth, natural variation or climate change 
(Eckstein 2010). Likewise, arguments that the human right to water was a ‘public’ right accruing 
to communities sought to foreclose on private service delivery options, even though they did not 
wholly escape this possibility (Bakker 2007). As the debate developed, anti-privatization efforts 
consolidated around the idea that water is a ‘commons.’  And this created a conceptual stalemate. 
On the one hand, the ‘human right to water’ was declared part of a ‘commons’ in order to protect 
public goods. On the other, discharging the human right to water, as Ban Ki Moon noted shortly 
after the declaration on the human right to water and sanitation was passed, did not prevent 
private options for delivering public goods. Such a scenario was forecast and remarked on by 
Bakker (2007, 2012).  
 
Amidst the private/public debate over the commons were more nuanced accounts of what  
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was at stake in the deployment of a predominantly liberal conception of self-governance. These 
drew attention to how protecting substantive claims to water under any single regime required 
the conformance of pluralistic conceptions of social and interpersonal relationships to fit one 
model of rights. This worked from two directions. The first countered the view that all rights are 
reducible to property rights through recognition that creating private rights can dispossess or 
otherwise deny certain customary rights (Swyngedouw 2005). The second, as Meinzen-Dick and 
Nkonya (2005: 11) suggest, was that codifying rights under the liberal state and universal 
conditions of ‘equality’ could create uneven outcomes with respect to water, 
 
“Codification of rights does not allow for consideration of special circumstance, such as 
basic livelihood needs, that are given substantial weight in customary systems. This is 
partly due to limitation of state capacity to interpret individual circumstance, but it also 
derives from current emphasis on the ‘rule of law’, which implies that everyone should 
be treated equally, without special considerations”. 
 
The liberal vision of freedom, as highlighted above, may be questioned when it is 
incongruous with moral and political norms that already fit individual claims to an alternate 
conception of the social world. This is especially the case when that world does not conform to 
self-constituting explanations of the state or ‘the rule of law’ and may, in fact, seek to confront 
the very idea of the liberal state itself. Conflicts of this type arise when sources of normative and 
legal legitimacy other than the state are declared illegitimate, either ex cathedra or through 
colonial violence. For instance, the lack of legal recognition of indigenous water rights of First 
Nations in Canada is directly linked to the interpretation of claims to water in Eurocentric law 
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and is, ipso facto, a denial of the source of legal sovereignty held by First Nations (Phare 2009). 
In the Canadian case, as elsewhere, the denial of alternate sources of legitimacy for water rights 
are often tied to broader claims regarding political economy and the historical violence 
underlying property rights. As Wilkinson (2010) shows from U.S. court decisions, property 
development premised on the denial of indigenous water rights has even be used to stop legal 
challenges so that “non-Indian expectations” are not disturbed. 
 
The foregoing discussion can also be seen as one of how Taylor’s (2003) atomism-holism 
and individualist-collectivist distinction bears on considerations of the human right to water.  In 
the first case, when a liberal conception is universally extended based on atomistic properties of 
individuals (i.e. rationality, autonomy), claims regarding ‘the commons’ have little substantive 
differences with private rights because both operate on similar accounts of the individual 
(Schmidt 2012). By contrast, proponents of ‘the commons’ frequently argue that individuals self-
identify in holistic terms and in relation to the communities they are a part of (Brown 2008). In 
the second case, as Mitchell (2012) has argued, the question of property rights requires 
examination alongside arguments regarding the human right to water because of entanglements 
with political economy. Here the social relations of property rights bear on whether other 
resource rights are designed to give primacy to individual or collective goods. In what follows, 
we offer a matrix for clarifying amongst different appeals to ‘the commons’ with the aim of 
considering how the human right to water may be understood through lenses other than 
liberalism. 
 
3. The water commons 
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Incorporating water as part of the commons represents one potential (and popular) 
strategy for resolving part-whole concerns regarding human rights. However, a single commons 
framework does not presently exist, although various appellations seek to counter neoliberal 
trends toward deregulation, liberalization and privatization. Part of the shared foci may be to 
confront what Blomley (2008) describes as a ‘liberal-economistic model’ that animates the 
‘analytical and political imagination’ in property structures that work on a binary model of 
private versus state ownership. Blomley (2008) makes the case that there is a strong political and 
moral basis to the ‘commons’ that may counter the public-private binary and form a new 
category of legitimacy for common property. In practice, the potential spectrum for political or 
moral norms is very large given the diversity of ways available to define communities and 
articulate their normative significance (see Mason 2000). Here we argue that the human right to 
water can be understood more clearly when accounts of ‘the commons’ are identified according 
to how they incorporate both political advocacy and moral legitimacy. 
 
Table 1 presents a tool for assessing different variants of ‘the commons’ in reference to 
the distinction between atomism/holism and individualism/collectivism as they relate to issues of 
moral legitimacy and political advocacy. As we argue in the next four sub-sections, this matrix 
offers the opportunity to assess different approaches to the moral and political basis of the 
commons in terms of how they affect interpretations of property rights. In so doing, the matrix 
can be deployed for a more ambitious aim, which is to help distinguish where and when appeals 
to the commons come into contact and/or conflict with abstract ideals of human rights, such as 
those noted above. 
   17 
 
 
[Insert Table 1 here: currently attached separately after the list of references] 
 
3.1 Common property 
 
 The contemporary recovery of ‘the commons’ began with Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the 
common’s’ thesis and the idea that individuals are locked into selfish and rational games of 
utility maximization that, when pursued collectively, undermine the resource base and lead to 
collapse. Responses to Hardin’s account, most notably by Ostrom (1990), showed several flaws 
with his assessment and offered an alternate account to show that his arguments were aimed at 
‘open access’ resources and not those where at least some communally sanctioned rules curtail 
individual behavior short of communal demise. In other words, as Blomley (2008: 318) points 
out, “a commons property regime is operative when a resource is held by an identifiable 
community of interdependent users, who exclude outsiders while regulating internal use by 
community members.” Initially, accounts of the commons borrowed on the idea of ‘common 
property’ where rights were conceived of as “private property for the group of co-owners” and 
where “…the difference between private and common property is not to be found in the nature of 
the rights and duties as much as in the number to which inclusion or exclusion applies” (Bromley 
1991: 25, 29 original emphasis). 
 
 On the common property account, the individuals who populate the commons are legally 
no different than private individuals and this individualism provides the basis for the corporate 
rights of the community. This version of the commons, however, was criticized by Agrawal 
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(2003) for assuming that ‘sovereign subjects’ came ready-made for rationally navigating 
governance institutions. A second part of Agrawal’s critique cited the lack of attention to power 
dynamics in governance institutions themselves. Together, these critiques served to sharpen 
unease about tying accounts of the commons too closely to the assumptions of private property 
and its ontological claims regarding self-governing individuals. It also raised questions regarding 
whether institutions governing the commons were not oriented more towards collectivist 
strategies. These types of concerns prompted a shift away from explaining the commons in terms 
of common property and towards explanations of ‘common-pool resources’. 
 
3.2 Common-pool resources 
 
The common property account has significant shortcomings because, in some cases of the 
commons, property claims were non-existent, or if they did exist, were not always recognized by 
formal legal arrangements (Feeny et. al. 1990). To address this, the literature shifted towards the 
notion of ‘common-pool resources’ (CPR) by distinguishing between “the nature of the good 
(common-pool resources) and a property regime (common-property regimes)” (Hess and Ostrom 
2003: 118). This distinction enabled an assessment of how the production function for a given 
resource unit (i.e. water) operates in reference to shared governance practices without conflating 
this production function with the allocation function of a particular rights regime (Ostrom, 2003). 
In so doing, CPR retained its atomistic commitments but shifted the orientation of institutional 
structures towards advocating for collective rather than individual success. In this sense, and as 
Ostrom (2005) argued, agent behavior can still be explained by modified rational-choice theory, 
but behavior is interpreted in terms of how individuals seek not only to navigate social structures, 
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but also to support long-term institutional viability. In this modified rational-choice explanation 
(and the game-theoretic assumptions it incorporates), CPR has higher requirements for political 
integration because individuals are required to navigate similar social structures in similar ways.  
 
Although accounts of CPR see individuals in relation to social structures, individuals are 
not defined through them. As such, governance institutions retain their atomistic orientation with 
the modifications to rational-choice theory moving towards political advocacy for collective 
goods, such as the preservation of social structures themselves. In so doing, ‘common-pool 
resources’ also retain the notion of individual self-governance as the basis for rights regimes, and 
this account can be troubled by non-western views towards the self (and others) with respect to 
resource rights (Schmidt and Dowsley 2010). As a result, the priority assigned to individual 
rationality requires CPR to premise political integration on a theory of reasoning rather than on 
the actual claims or social rules that govern shared resources. Thus, rather than have individuals 
defined as members of a community, CPR holds that the commons represents the pooled 
interests of individuals who view the most rational route to securing shared institutions as 
curtailing self interest in favor of social success. 
 
3.3  Legal Pluralism 
 
 The atomistic-collectivist claims of CPR contrast with those who question whether such 
accounts go far enough in helping to arrest the basic inequalities that may characterize existing 
social structures that govern the commons. For instance, Zwartveen and Meinzen-Dick (2001) 
argue that oppressive gender norms are not fully confronted without situating the differential 
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rights to water between men and women within the multiple spheres of social values that 
legitimate them. The alternate suggested is not to understand rights regimes in the commons 
through explanations that ultimately rely on the properties of individuals but on a holistic 
conception of individual goods. Under this model, legal pluralism offers accounts of the 
commons where individuals can avail themselves of different spheres of value that form the basis 
not only for political advocacy but also different kinds of rights. For instance, Pradhan and 
Meinzin-Dick (2003) show how multiple sources of legitimacy from religious, state, 
international, project, or local norms can overlap in particular cases in which claims to water are 
contested.  
  
 In models of legal pluralism, claims to the commons have relatively low requirements for 
political integration because overlapping spheres of value (i.e. religious, customary) are not 
presumed to be reducible to each other. That is, individual goods are holistically tied to multiple 
different spheres of value and these goods may be secured by marshalling any number of the 
appropriate spheres of value, such as those of religion or custom, that support political advocacy 
for rights. Importantly, the use of countervailing arguments is not dependent on the properties of 
individuals, such as whether their appeals fit criteria of rational choice theory, but on the ability 
to define the individual good in relation to various value spheres that make that good worth 
protecting, such as appealing to state law to overcome gender discrimination in customary rights. 
From this perspective there are important reasons to be cautious in the formalization of claims, 
since the sphere of value (i.e. state, religious or international law) used to entrain rights can close 
off particular options for individuals in the commons (see generally Benda-Beckman et al. 2006). 
Critically, however, legal pluralism can be interpreted as advocating for the individuals, or 
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concatenations of oppressed individuals (i.e. women), who seek rights. In this sense, claims to 
the commons are not necessarily oriented toward the good of existing versions of collectivities 
themselves, since these may be premised on uneven power relationships or spheres of values that 
favor certain groups based on, for instance, gender, caste or class. Rather, collective 
sustainability is an outcome of institutional protections that enable particular individuals to 
pursue their own good along with others who do the same.  
 
3.4 Moral economy 
 
Like legal pluralism, accounts of the ‘moral economy’ of the water commons presume 
upon the social good being the “concatenation of individual goods” (Taylor 2003: 195). Unlike 
accounts of legal pluralism, however, claims regarding the ‘moral economy’ of the commons 
identify how policies and norms give primacy to community life or collective goals. This notion 
of communal legitimacy conceives of rights as being subject to communal norms that are broadly 
held and consistently applied. As Trawick (2010) has documented, these types of arrangements 
for governing the commons have high requirements for political integration because all claims to 
the commons require adhering to the same set of norms and the same values. Thus, the difference 
between accounts of legal pluralism and those of moral economy lies in the degree to which 
competing spheres of value affect actual decisions regarding water. In accounts of the moral 
economy of water these norms are intrinsic to the group, but may also hold for principles that are 
consistent across multiple types of organizational systems. For instance, Trawick (2010) 
identifies common rules for successful water management in Peru, Mexico, Spain, India, Nepal, 
Bali and the Philipines: communal autonomy, contiguity in water provision, uniformity among 
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rights, proportionality among rights, and the regularity and transparency of applying and 
maintaining communal infrastructure and institutions.  
 
In light of the holist-collectivist position of moral economy approaches to the commons, 
and the higher degree of political integration this entails, it is not entirely surprising that such 
arrangements issue from smaller scales. Nonetheless, there is increasing evidence that scale 
alone is not a determining factor for pursuing this agenda. As recent work by Boelens et al 
(2010) reveals, larger communities have effectively pursued similar goals at the state and 
national levels based not so much on uniformity within the community but on shared 
commitments against the imposition of external forms of governance, particularly the 
individualist programs of neo-liberal water policies. These instances of resistance are not based 
on countering abstract ideals with alternate forms of abstract rights. Rather, they appeal to 
alternate sources of legitimacy that, at least in some cases, stand against those of the state and 
proclivities towards forms of property that do not respect alternate, often communal, tenure 
arrangements. As such, they do not fit neatly within a model of legal pluralism because they are 
not countering one sphere of value (i.e. state law) with another. Rather, they are countering one 
form of life, and its attendant social relations, with another. Furthermore, they do not present as 
the kinds of rights that fall within the purview of political liberalism because they seek to 
confront the very idea that standardized, abstracted rights, adequately reflect how individual 
goods support community life or the collective good.   
 
4. Discussion: the commons’ matrix 
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 When distinctions between atomism/holism and individualism/collectivism are applied to 
various accounts of the commons, it becomes clearer that the many different types of communal 
arrangements that accounts of the commons seek to explain are not equal with respect to how the 
human right to water is expected to fit with other rights, such as those to property. For instance, 
atomistic views typically appeal to abstract standards of rationality to explain individual behavior 
and, as a consequence, tend to see rights as ‘strategies’ for procuring benefits without 
undermining shared resources. Alternately, the methodological individualism of atomists can be 
rejected, along with the utilitarian metrics of success it entails, by noting how many water 
doctrines are already grounded in norms oriented to support the community (see Schmidt, 2012). 
Sax (1994: 15), for instance, has shown how doctrines of appurtenance that tie water claims to 
land tenure systems—from private property to interstate law—that issue from recognition that 
“water in place is a type of wealth.” As Sax notes, this of course returns us to the question of 
which community’s wealth is considered relevant in a particular place. This issue 
notwithstanding, once viewed as an issue of an existing (i.e. not abstract) community, many 
water norms are not an easy fit with property rights either in terms of social goals or their 
cumulative effect on ecological systems (Butler 2000). In the case of collectivist explanations, 
then, the ‘economistic’ imagination of the purpose of rights can be countered, as it is by many 
indigenous conceptions, by seeing rights as “a bundle of relationships rather than a bundle of 
economic rights” (Shiva 2001: 46). 
 
One complaint regarding ‘collective’ explanations of the commons is that the notion of 
the ‘community’ underlying them is too ambiguous, and that in fact many communities simply 
do not have the capacity or the wherewithal to effectively govern water (Bakker 2008, 2010). In 
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the case of the human right to water, however, what is at stake is not only this problem. Rather, 
what is at stake is both how and whether existing (and yet-to-be-developed) governance 
institutions should be oriented with respect to relationships amongst different goods. That is, the 
question is also whether governance institutions should hold norms that conform to rights in a 
way that grants primacy to individual rights and freedoms or to collective goods. As such, the 
claim that ‘community’ is too ambiguous draws out issues of moral legitimacy but, on the matrix 
developed here, leaves issues of political advocacy somewhat unclear. 
 
A final issue, and one that occupies the remaining section of this paper, is how a more 
nuanced approach to the political economy of the commons actually fares with respect to 
preventing degradation to the resource base. In this sense, one key feature of the proposed matrix 
is that it allows us to extricate accounts of the commons that do not continue the trend of 
securing rights according to abstract ideals of rationality, autonomy or private rights in favor of 
anchoring explanations in norms that are potentially congruent with ecological values because 
they are rooted in actual social and ecological relations. This implicates a large task of rethinking 
existing cases with the above distinctions at hand, and one that this paper cannot undertake in 
full. But there are grounds to pursue this issue given similar problems in ecology regarding how 
part-whole relationships variously work to support both individual goods and those of species. 
What is required, however, is to step away from liberal conceptions of rights and to rethink part-
whole relationships within a commons framework that does not presume the basic issue at stake 
is the resolution of antagonistic claims to water but a dual dynamic of competition and 
cooperation. 
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5. The human right to the ‘water commons’ without liberalism 
 
 There is no mention of collective rights in the UDHR, save Article 29: “Everyone has 
duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is 
possible.” In this way, human rights are endowed and exercised in such a way that is consistent 
with the liberal tradition whereby the conception of community begins and ends with the 
individual (Watson, 1999). As such, here we ask:  are human rights compatible with indigenous 
or other forms of rights to common resources, such as those that adhere to communities? There 
are interesting proxy arguments, such as those found in the European Union’s (2000) Water 
Framework Directive, which is as a “framework for Community action in the field of water 
policy.” The reinvigoration of communal agency, and the conceptualization of “others” with 
respect to existing legal norms, has been furthered in recent work on environmental law (see 
Kysar 2010). Further, the orientation to communal agency has been given a pragmatist defense 
by Norton (2005) who argues that, once methodological individualism is jettisoned, space opens 
up for pluralistic approaches to values and political action that may be positioned in reference to 
the goods of human and ecological communities. In this way, attending to communal agency 
presents an alternate route to recent attempts to fit explanations of ‘the commons’ that maintain 
fidelity to accounts of individual rationality to social-ecological systems (contrast Ostrom 2007, 
2009).  
 
The foregoing arguments suggest that we can move away from accounts of the commons 
that are grounded in liberal assumptions about persons, rationality and the maximization of 
resources in patterns of political economy. To do so we might confront the basic antagonism 
   26 
 
presumed between the individual and the community and reject the notion that the aim of a 
‘human right to water’ is to protect the independent rights of persons. Rather, we can begin with 
interdependent persons as part of an interdependent whole and replace an antagonistic 
disposition with an agonistic one, where competition is among adversaries, not enemies.  
 
One place to anchor an agonistic conception of the commons and the human right to 
water is in models of complex systems ecology. There, as Leopold (1966: 238) eruditely stated, 
“[p]olitics and economics are advanced symbioses in which the original free-for-all competition 
has been replaced, in part, by cooperative mechanisms with an ethical content.” This view, as is 
well-known, ultimately leads Leopold to make an ecological shift where ethics are a mode 
“community instinct” for guidance under conditions of uncertainty, such as those currently 
pervading concerns regarding global hydrological variability and human rights (cf. Milly et al. 
2008; Eckstein 2010). More recently, Tully (2008) has offered an ecological ethic in line with an 
agonistic conception of politics. Tully notes that the global economic system is itself an open 
network, and able to be disturbed in multiple ways by civic politics. He then grounds an 
ecological ethic in an agonistic politics where the on-going negotiations of practical governance 
systems work to reach decisions in the here and now without extending those norms indefinitely. 
 
An agonistic commitment to reciprocal political agreements holds potential to link to the 
non-equilibrium paradigm of ecology in which the uncertain and changing nature of systems 
troubles basic assumptions of law and its orientation towards reaching ‘finality’ (Tarlock 1993). 
It does so by reorienting the kinds of social relationships that legal norms are charged with 
protecting away from those of capitalist modes of production and towards those compatible with 
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our growing ecological knowledge. As we argued for above, the political economy of resource 
rights holds a basic antagonism between individuals with respect to the objects of property, 
hence the purpose of law is to reach a final decision on the rights of competing parties. But in the 
real economy of social-ecological systems many resources are shared and the consequences of 
different uses interdependent. This is especially so in the case of water. As such, moving in the 
direction of green property can provide an ecological therapeutic for law (i.e. Byrne, 1990). The 
view we are setting out requires further development, particularly with respect to the particular 
ways that social and economic rights are already embedded in political and moral communities 
that depend upon water, and issues of identity and the relation of individuals to the law in 
agonistic politics (see respectively, McManus 2008; Tully 2003). As Freyfogle (1996) suggests, 
it is critical to recognize that water holds multiple values within different communities that 
cannot fairly be reduced to a single scheme of rights. By shifting towards an explanation 
compatible with complex systems ecology, however, diverse kinds of communities can be 
supported through arguments regarding how part-whole relationships amongst persons are one 
expression of the evolutionary communities supported by Earth systems (i.e. Wheeler 2006). 
Thus, aside from where we may fall in terms of ultimate explanations regarding whether 
individual goods are atomistic or holistic, political advocacy for the water commons may be 
oriented to the practical systems affected by human actions and of which humans are an 
interdependent part. 
  
 Agonistic politics directly confront conceptions of persons who are autonomous and 
abstracted from social relations, and which provide no substantive arguments for getting them 
into social or environmental relationships without stipulating that the goal and end of any system 
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of rights is to maintain the kind liberty that exists under prevailing modes of production. That is, 
systems where there has been an exchange of the right for the good and where political 
participation is considered fair by virtue of procedural rules rather than being oriented towards 
mechanisms that respect alternate accounts of the good or the forms of life that support them. By 
contrast, the agonistic conception favors substantive claims where persons begin as 
interdependent members of an interdependent whole. This substantive turn also presents a robust 
option for confronting the institutions of liberalism (including neo-liberal economics) because 
the goal of social policy is not to remove barriers to the free pursuit of liberty but to ensure that 
the conditions upon which competition to resources depend are not structured so as to produce 
winners and losers, but an indefinite field of fair play. Evidence of such systems exists under 
multiple types of arrangements that the term ‘commons’ serves to heuristically identify. 
Underlying the heuristic, however, are diverse sets of values, notions of identity, governance 
arrangements and social-ecological conditions that offer alternate worlds in which to internalize 
claims regarding the human right to water. Recognizing the differences between these worlds—
and the variants of the commons they imply—is critical for assessing arguments that seek to 
reconcile human rights with practical systems of governance. It is also critical to understanding 
why claims to the commons maintain political and moral purchase despite theoretical arguments 
regarding their fit with liberal notions of property.  
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Table One: Rights regimes in the commons.  
 
 
Holist Legal Pluralism Moral Economy
Atomist
Common 
Property
Common-pool 
Resource Theory
Individualist Collectivist
Rights regimes in the commons
Political advocacy
Moral 
basis of 
individual 
goods
